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Abstract
In fair division problems with indivisible goods it
is well known that one cannot have any guaran-
tees for the classic fairness notions of envy-freeness
and proportionality. As a result, several relax-
ations have been introduced, most of which in quite
recent works. We focus on four such notions,
namely envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), envy-
freeness up to any good (EFX), maximin share fair-
ness (MMS), and pairwise maximin share fairness
(PMMS). Since obtaining these relaxations also
turns out to be problematic in several scenarios, ap-
proximate versions of them have been considered.
In this work, we investigate further the connections
between the four notions mentioned above and their
approximate versions. We establish several tight, or
almost tight, results concerning the approximation
quality that any of these notions guarantees for the
others, providing an almost complete picture of this
landscape. Some of our findings reveal interesting
and surprising consequences regarding the power
of these notions, e.g., PMMS and EFX provide the
same worst-case guarantee for MMS, despite PMMS
being a strictly stronger notion than EFX. We be-
lieve such implications provide further insight on
the quality of approximately fair solutions.
1 Introduction
In this work, we revisit fairness notions for allocating indivis-
ible goods. The objective in fair division is to allocate a set of
resources to a set of agents in a way that leaves everyone sat-
isfied, according to their own preferences. Over the years, the
field has grown along various directions, with a substantial
literature by now, and with several applications. We refer the
reader to the surveys [Bouveret et al., 2016; Procaccia, 2016;
Markakis, 2017] for more recent results, and to the classic
textbooks [Brams and Taylor, 1996; Robertson and Webb,
1998; Moulin, 2003] for an overview of the area.
To model such allocation problems, one needs to specify
the preferences of the agents, and the fairness criterion un-
der consideration. For the preferences, we stick to the usual
assumption of associating each agent with an additive valua-
tion function on the set of resources. As for fairness criteria,
one of the classic desirable notions that have been proposed
is envy-freeness, meaning that no agent has a higher value for
the bundle of another agent than for her own [Foley, 1967;
Varian, 1974]. Unfortunately, for problems with indivisible
goods, this turns out to be a very strong requirement. Exis-
tence of envy-free allocations cannot be guaranteed, and the
relevant algorithmic and approximability questions are also
computationally hard [Lipton et al., 2004].
Given these concerns, recent works have considered relax-
ations of envy-freeness that seem more appropriate for set-
tings with indivisible items, see, e.g., [Budish, 2011; Cara-
giannis et al., 2016]. Our work focuses on four such notions,
namely envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), envy-freeness
up to any good (EFX), maximin share fairness (MMS), and
pairwise maximin share fairness (PMMS). All these capture
different ways of allowing envy in an allocation, albeit in a
restricted way. For instance, EF1 requires that no agent en-
vies another agent’s bundle after removing from it her most
valued item.
These relaxations are still no panacea, especially since ex-
istence results have either been elusive or simply negative. So
far, we only know that EF1 allocations always exist, whereas
this is not true for MMS allocations. As a result, this has natu-
rally led to approximate versions of these notions, accompa-
nied by some positive algorithmic results (see related work).
What has not been well charted yet, however, is the relation
between these four notions and their approximate counter-
parts, especially concerning the approximation quality that
any of these notions guarantees for the others. For example,
does an MMS or an approximate MMS allocation (for which
we do know efficient algorithms) provide an approximation
guarantee in terms of the EFX or the PMMS criteria? As it
turns out (Prop. 4.5, Cor. 4.9), it does not. As another exam-
ple, while we know that PMMS implies EFX, it is not clear if
an approximate PMMS allocation is also approximately EFX.
In fact (Prop. 3.7 and 4.8), it is the other way around! Such
results can be conceptually helpful, as they deepen our under-
standing of the similarities and differences between fairness
criteria. Furthermore, this insight allows us to either trans-
late an approximation algorithm for one notion into an ap-
proximation algorithm for another, or to establish that such
an approach cannot yield approximability or existential re-
sults. Given the growing interest in these relaxations, we find
it important to further explore these interconnections.
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Contribution. We investigate how the four notions men-
tioned above and their approximate versions are related. For
each one of them, we examine the approximation guarantee
that it provides in terms of the other three notions. Our results
provide an almost complete mapping of the landscape, and in
most cases our approximation guarantees are tight. Some of
our results provide interesting and surprising consequences.
Indicatively, some highlights of our results include:
– PMMS and EFX allocations both provide the same con-
stant approximation with respect to the MMS criterion.
– Although PMMS implies EFX, an approximate PMMS al-
location may be arbitrarily bad in terms of approximate
EFX. On the contrary, an approximate EFX allocation
does provide some guarantee with respect to PMMS.
– While EFX is a much stronger concept than EF1, they
both provide comparable constant approximations for
the PMMS criterion and this degrades smoothly for ap-
proximate EFX and EF1 allocations.
– Although exact PMMS and MMS are defined in a sim-
ilar manner, the former implies EFX, EF1, and a 4=7-
approximation in terms of MMS, while the latter pro-
vides no guarantee with respect to the other notions.
– Our results also suggest a simple efficient algorithm for
computing a 1=2-approximate PMMS allocation (the cur-
rent best),1 and improvements in certain special cases.
Some of the implications between the different notions are
depicted in Figure 1.
Related Work. Regarding the several relaxations of envy-
freeness, the notion of EF1 originates in the work of Lip-
ton et al. [2004], where both existence and algorithmic re-
sults are provided. The concept of MMS was introduced by
Budish [2011], building on concepts of Moulin [1990], and
later defined as considered here by Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre
[2016], who studied a hierarchy of exact fairness concepts.
Kurokawa, Procaccia and Wang [2018; 2016] showed that
MMS allocations do not always exist even for three agents.
From the computational point of view, 2=3-approximation al-
gorithms for MMS allocations are known [Kurokawa et al.,
2018; Amanatidis et al., 2017b; Barman and Krishnamurthy,
2017] and recently this approximation factor has been im-
proved to 3=4 [Seddighin et al., 2018]. Some variants of the
maximin share criterion have also been considered [Suksom-
pong, 2018]. As for the notions of EFX and PMMS, they were
introduced in the work of Caragiannis et al. [2016], which
provided some initial results on how these are related to each
other as well as to MMS and to EF1. In particular, they es-
tablished that a PMMS allocation is also an EFX, EF1 and 12 -
MMS allocation. Barman and Krishnamurty [2017] showed
that when the agents agree on the ordering of the items ac-
cording to their value, then EFX allocations do exist and a
specific EFX allocation can be produced, that is also a 23 -MMS
allocation. The existence and computation of exact and ap-
proximate EFX allocations under additive and general valua-
1Independently, the recent work of [Barman et al., 2018a] (The-
orem 1), which concerns a stronger concept, also implies an efficient
algorithm for computing 1=2-PMMS allocations.
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Figure 1: An indicative chart of implications with envy-freeness as
a starting point. All implications shown are tight or almost tight.
tions was studied by Plaut and Roughgarden [2018], estab-
lishing the currently best 1=2-approximation. Finally, in a
recent work, Barman et al. [2018a] introduce two new fair-
ness notions that are strongly related to the notions studied
here, namely groupwise maximin share fairness (GMMS) and
envy-freeness up to one less-preferred good (EFL). Study-
ing how their approximate versions fit into the landscape ex-
plored here is an interesting direction for future work.
2 Preliminaries
We assume we have a set of n agents, N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng
and a set M of m indivisible goods. Following the usual as-
sumptions in the majority of the fair division literature, each
agent is associated with a monotone, additive valuation func-
tion. Hence, for every S  M , vi(S) =
P
g2S vi(fgg).
For simplicity, we will use vi(g) instead of vi(fgg) for g 2
M . Monotonicity here implies that vi(g)  0 for every
i 2 N; g 2M .
We are interested in solutions that allocate the whole set of
goods M to the agents. An allocation of M to the n agents is
therefore a partition, A = (A1; : : : ; An), where Ai \Aj = ;
and
S
iAi = M . By n(M) we denote the set of all parti-
tions of a set M into n bundles.
2.1 Fairness Concepts
Our work focuses on relaxations of the classic notion of envy-
freeness, initially suggested by Gamow and Stern [1958], and
more formally by Foley [1967] and Varian [1974].
Definition 2.1. An allocationA = (A1; : : : ; An) is envy-free
(EF), if for every i; j 2 N , vi(Ai)  vi(Aj).
It is well known that envy-freeness is a very strict require-
ment in the presence of indivisible goods. This gives rise
to considering relaxations of envy-freeness, with the hope of
obtaining more positive results.
We begin with two such relaxations, and their approximate
versions, where an agent may envy some other agent, but only
by an amount dependent on the value of a single item in the
other agent’s bundle. Formally:
Definition 2.2. An allocation A = (A1; : : : ; An) is an
– -EF1 allocation (-envy-free up to one good), if for ev-
ery pair of agents i; j 2 N , with Aj 6= ;, there exists an
item g 2 Aj , such that vi(Ai)    vi(Aj n fgg).
– -EFX allocation (-envy-free up to any good), if
vi(Ai)    vi(Aj n fgg) holds for every pair i; j 2 N ,
with Aj 6= ;, and for every g 2 Aj with vi(g) > 0.2
2The requirement that vi(g) > 0 in the definition of -EFX has
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Note that for  = 1 in the above definitions, we ob-
tain precisely the notions of envy-freeness up to one good
(EF1) [Budish, 2011] and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX)
[Caragiannis et al., 2016]. The difference between these two
notions is simply the quantifier regarding the item that elim-
inates envy when removed from an agent’s bundle. Clearly,
EF implies EFX, which in turn implies EF1.
We now move on to a different notion, also proposed by
Budish [2011]. Motivated by the question of what we can
guarantee in the worst case to the agents, the rationale is to
think of a generalization of the well-known cut-and-choose
protocol to multiple agents: Suppose that agent i is asked
to partition the goods into n bundles and then the rest of the
agents choose a bundle before i. In the worst case, agent iwill
be left with her least valuable bundle. Hence, a risk-averse
agent would choose a partition that maximizes the minimum
value of a bundle in the partition. This gives rise to the fol-
lowing definition.
Definition 2.3. Given n agents, and a subset S  M of
items, the n-maximin share of agent i with respect to S is:
i(n; S) = maxA2n(S)
min
Aj2A
vi(Aj) :
From the definition, it directly follows that n  i(n; S) 
vi(S). When S = M , this quantity is called the maximin
share of agent i. We say that T 2 n(M) is an n-maximin
share defining partition for agent i, if minTj2T vi(Tj) =
i(n;M). When it is clear from context what n and M are,
we will simply write i instead of i(n;M). The solution
concept we are interested in, asks for a partition that gives
each agent her (approximate) maximin share.
Definition 2.4. An allocationA = (A1; : : : ; An) is called an
-MMS (-maximin share) allocation if vi(Ai)    i , for
every i 2 N .
The last notion we define is related but not directly compa-
rable to MMS. The idea is that instead of imagining an agent
i partitioning the items into n bundles, we think of i as parti-
tioning the combined bundle of herself and another agent into
two bundles and receiving the one she values less.
Definition 2.5. An allocationA = (A1; : : : ; An) is called an
-PMMS (-pairwise maximin share) allocation if for every
pair of agents i; j 2 N ,
vi(Ai)    max
(B1;B2)
minfvi(B1); vi(B2)g ;
where (B1; B2) 2 2(Ai [Aj).
In Definitions 2.4 and 2.5, when  = 1, we refer to the
corresponding allocations as MMS and PMMS allocations re-
spectively. It has been already observed that the notion of
PMMS is stronger than EFX [Caragiannis et al., 2016].
Example 1. To illustrate the relevant definitions, let us con-
sider an instance with 3 agents and 5 items:
a b c d e
Agent 1 3 1 1 1 4
Agent 2 4 3 3 1 4
Agent 3 3 2 1 3 4
been dropped by Plaut and Roughgarden [2018] but several of their
results hold under the assumption of all values being strictly positive.
If M = fa; b; c; d; eg is the set of items, one can see that
1(3;M) = 3, 2(3;M) = 4, 3(3;M) = 4. For example,
looking at agent 1, there exists a partition so that the worst
bundle is worth a value of 3, and there is no partition where
the worst bundle is better. Similarly, agent 2 can produce a
partition where the worst bundle has a value of 4 for her, and
there is no other partition that can guarantee a better worst-
case value.
Let us examine the allocation A = (feg; fb; cg; fa; dg).
Clearly, this is an EF allocation, and hence it is also an EFX,
EF1, MMS, and PMMS allocation. Consider now the allocation
B = (fag; fb; eg; fc; dg). This is no longer EF and it is also
neither EFX nor PMMS. However, it is an EF1 as well as an
MMS allocation. Clearly, each agent i receives a value of at
least i(3;M). To see why it is EF1, note that agents 1 and 3
envy agent 2 but removing item e from the bundle of agent 2
eliminates the envy from either agent. We can also see that B
is a 34 -EFX allocation. To verify this, we can look at agent 1,
and compare the value of her bundle to the bundle of agent 2
when we remove either item b or e. Finally, it is not hard to
check that B is also a 34 -PMMS allocation.
3 EFX and EF1 Allocations
We begin our exposition with the more direct relaxations of
envy-freeness, EF1 and EFX. Within this section, we always
start with either an -EF1 or -EFX allocation, for some  2
(0; 1], and explore the implications and fairness guarantees
that can be derived. We also pay particular attention to the
case of exact EFX or EF1 allocations, i.e., for  = 1. Due to
lack of space, several of our proofs, are deferred to the full
version of the paper.
We already know that EFX is stronger than EF1. Our first
warm-up proposition states that this also holds in an approxi-
mation preserving sense. We complement this by the fact that
EF1 allocations cannot provide any approximation to EFX.
Proposition 3.1. For n  2, any -EFX allocation is also an
-EF1 allocation for any  2 (0; 1]. On the other hand, an
EF1 allocation is not necessarily an -EFX allocation for any
 2 (0; 1].
Before proving guarantees in terms of MMS and PMMS, we
state a useful technical lemma which generalizes both (the
k = 1 case of) Lemma 1 of Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre [2016]
and Lemma 3.4 of Amanatidis et al. [2017b].
Lemma 3.2. Suppose T 2 n(M) is an n-maximin
share defining partition for agent i, i.e., minTj2T vi(Tj) =
i(n;M). Then, for any set of goods S, such that there exists
some j with S  Tj , it holds that
i(n  1;M S)  i(n;M) :
In particular, for any item g, i(n 1;M fgg)  i(n;M).
Next we study EFX allocations in terms of the MMS guaran-
tees they can provide, starting with the case of a small number
of agents.
Proposition 3.3. For n 2 f2; 3g, an EFX allocation is also a
2
3 -MMS allocation. Moreover, this guarantee is tight.
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Proof. We prove the statement for n = 2. The proof for the
case of three agents is of similar flavor, albeit more complex,
and is deferred to the full version.
Suppose that we have an EFX allocation A = (A1; A2).
We show that for agent 1 we have v1(A1)  231(2;M).
The case of agent 2 is symmetric. Since items of no value for
agent 1 are completely irrelevant for her view of both EFX and
MMS allocations, we can assume without loss of generality,
that v1(g) > 0 for all g 2M .
In the sequel, we write 1 instead of 1(n;M). IfA2 = ;,
then clearly v1(A1) = v1(M)  1, so we may assumejA2j  1. If jA2j = fgg, then v1(A1) = v1(M fgg) =
1(1;M fgg)  1(2;M) = 1, where the inequality
follows from Lemma 3.2. The remaining case is when jA2j 
2. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that v1(A1) < 231.
Since A is an EFX allocation, we have that
v1(A2)  v1(A1) + v1(g) ; (1)
where g 2 arg minh2A2 v1(h). Since A2 contains at least
two items, we have
v1(g)  1
2
v1(A2) : (2)
Combining (1) and (2) we get v1(g)  v1(A1). Again by
(1), this implies that v1(A2) < 431. But then, v1(M) =
v1(A1) + v1(A2) <
6
31 = 21, a contradiction, since by
definition, we know that vi(M)  n  i for every i 2 N .
Regarding tightness, consider the following simple exam-
ple. Suppose that we have 2 agents and 4 items, a; b; c; d.
The agents have identical values over the items, specifically
vi(a) = vi(b) = 2 and vi(c) = vi(d) = 1, for i 2 f1; 2g. We
now look at the allocation A = (fa; bg; fc; dg). It is easy to
see that 1 = 2 = 3 and that A an EFX allocation. How-
ever v2(fc; dg) = 2 = 232. By adding an arbitrary number
of copies of agent 2 and an equal number of items of value 3,
this instance can be generalized to any number of agents.
Beyond three agents, the picture gets somewhat more com-
plicated. The next result is one of the main highlights of our
work. When moving from the case of n  3, to a higher
number of agents, the approximation guarantee achieved, in
terms of MMS, degrades from 2=3 to a quantity between
4=7 = 0:5714 and 0:5914. Surprisingly, the same happens
to the MMS guarantee of a PMMS allocation, as we show in
the next section.
It is interesting to note that recently Barman and Krishna-
murty [2017] obtained a simple 2=3-approximation algorithm
for MMS by showing that when agents agree on the ordering
of the values of the items, then there exists a particular EFX
allocation that is also a 2=3-MMS allocation. As indicated by
the proof of the following proposition, this is not true for all
EFX allocations, even when the agents are identical.
Proposition 3.4. For n  4, any EFX allocation is also a 47 -
MMS allocation. On the other hand, an EFX allocation is not
necessarily an -MMS allocation for  > 813 and, as n grows
large, for  > 0:5914.
Proof. Let A = (A1; : : : ; An) be an EFX allocation. Sup-
pose, towards a contradiction, that A is not a 47 -MMS alloca-
tion, i.e., there exists some j so that vj(Aj) < 47j(n;M).
Without loss of generality, we assume that agent 1 is such an
agent, and write 1 instead of 1(n;M). Note that we may
remove any agent, other than agent 1, that receives exactly
one good, and still end up with an EFX allocation that is not a
4
7 -MMS allocation. Indeed, if jAij = 1 for some i > 1, then
(A1; : : : ; Ai 1; Ai+1; : : : ; An) is an EFX allocation ofM Ai
toN fig and, by Lemma 3.2,1(n 1;M Ai)  1(n;M).
Thus, v1(A1) < 471(n  1;M Ai). Therefore, again with-
out loss of generality, we may assume that jAij > 1 for all
i > 1 in the initial allocation A.
GivenA, we say that a bundleAj is bad if j > 1, jAj j = 2,
and ming2Aj v1(g) >
1
2v1(A1). An item is bad if it belongs
to a bad bundle, while a bundle is good if it is not bad. Let B
be the set of all bad items.
It is not hard to show that if Ai is good, then v1(A1) 
2
3v1(Ai). When i = 1 this is straightforward; otherwise
we consider two cases. First assume that jAij = 2. Then,
by definition, we have ming2Ai v1(g)  12v1(A1) and,
since A is EFX, we have maxg2Ai v1(g)  v1(A1). Thus,
v1(Ai)  32v1(A1). Next, assume that jAij  3. Then,
ming2Ai v1(g)  13v1(Ai) and, since A is EFX, we have
v1(Ai)  ming2Ai v1(g)  v1(A1). Thus, we get v1(A1) 
v1(Ai)  13v1(Ai) = 23v1(Ai).
Now we are going to show that v1(A1)  471(n0;M 0) for
a reduced instance that we get by possibly removing some of
the items ofB, i.e., bad items. We do so in a way that ensures
that 1(n
0;M 0)  1, thus contradicting the choices of A
and A1. We consider an n-maximin share defining partition
T for agent 1, i.e., minTi2T v1(Ti) = 1. If there is a bun-
dle of T containing two items of B, g1, g2, then we remove
those two items and reduce the number of agents by one. By
Lemma 3.2, we have that 1(n  1;M fg1; g2g)  1. We
repeat as many times as necessary to get a reduced instance
with n0  n agents and a set of items M 0  M for which
there is an n0-maximin share defining partition T 0 for agent
1, such that no bundle contains more than 1 item of B. By
repeatedly using Lemma 3.2, we have 1(n
0;M 0)  1.
Let x be the number of items of B in the reduced instance
(recall that these items are defined with respect to A, hence
they belong to a bundle of size 2 in A and have value at least
1
2v1(A1) for agent 1). Clearly, x cannot be greater than n
0, or
some bundle of T 0 would contain at least 2 bad items. Fur-
ther, if jBj = y, i.e., the number of bad items in the original
instance, then we know that the number of good bundles inA
was n   y2 , and that the number of agents was reduced y x2
times, i.e., n0 = n  y x2 . Hence, we may express the number
of good bundles in the original instance in terms of n0 and x
only, as n0   x2 .
Recall that 1  1(n0;M 0) and, by the definition of
maximin share, 1(n
0;M 0)  1n0 v1(M 0). Thus
1 
1
n0
v1(M
0) : (3)
In order to upper bound v1(M 0), notice that M 0 contains all
the items of all the good bundles of A plus x bad items. As
discussed above, the value (with respect to agent 1) of each
good bundle is upper bounded by 32v1(A1). On the other
hand, A being EFX implies that maxg2Ai v1(g)  v1(A1)
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for any bad bundle Ai. That is, any bad item’s value is upper
bounded by v1(A1). So, we have
v1(M
0)  x  v1(A1) +

n0   x
2
  1
 3
2
v1(A1) + v1(A1)
=

3n0
2
+
x
4
  1
2

v1(A1)


3n0
2
+
n0
4
  1
2

v1(A1)
=
7n0   2
4
v1(A1) : (4)
We combine (3) and (4) to get v1(A1)  4n07n0 21  471,
which contradicts the choices of A and A1.
This establishes the positive part of the theorem. To see
that EFX does not imply anything stronger than 813 -MMS, no-
tice that for n0 = n = 4 the above analysis can be tight. On
one hand, 4n
0
7n0 2 =
8
13 in this case, while on the other hand
the following instance indicates that this is the best one can
guarantee for 4 agents. Suppose that we have 12 items with
the following values for agent 1:
v1(gi) =
(
1=8 1  i  4
1=2 5  i  8
1 9  i  12
It is not hard to see that 1 = 1+
1
2 +
1
8 =
13
8 in this instance.
Now consider the allocationA = (fg1; : : : ; g5g; fg6; g7; g8g;
fg9; g10g; fg11; g12g). Assuming that agents 2, 3 and 4 are
identical to agent 1, it is not hard to check that this is an EFX
allocation. Yet, v1(A1) = 1 = 8131. By adding an arbitrary
number of copies of agent 4 and her bundle, this instance can
be generalized to any number of agents.
The stronger bound for  as n grows large follows by
Proposition 4.1 and Proposition 4.3.
By following a similar analysis as in the proof of Proposi-
tion 3.3, it can be shown that for any number of agents -EFX
implies at least 2 -MMS. The actual guarantee, moreover, can-
not be much better than this.
Proposition 3.5. For n  2 and  2 (0; 1), any -EFX allo-
cation is also an n+2n 2 -MMS allocation but not necessarily
a -MMS allocation, for any  > 22+ . For n  4, the upper
bound is improved to maxf 1+ ; 811+2g.
In contrast to EFX, -EF1 allocations provide a much
weaker approximation of maximin shares, namely a ratio of
O( 1n ) for constant . The following proposition generalizes
a result of Caragiannis et al. [2016].3
Proposition 3.6. For n  2, any -EF1 allocation is also a

n 1+ -MMS allocation for any  2 (0; 1], and this is tight.
Finally, we investigate the implications that can be derived
for EFX and EF1 allocations, in terms of PMMS guarantees.
Despite Proposition 3.1 suggesting that (approximate) EF1 is
3The bound by Caragiannis et al. [2016] is for  = 1 and for
allocations that are both EF1 and Pareto optimal. It follows by their
proof, however, that it holds even when Pareto optimality is dropped.
much weaker than (approximate) EFX, the two notions give
comparable guarantees with respect to PMMS. In particular,
the guarantee implied by -EFX can be at most 4=3 times the
guarantee implied by -EF1.
Proposition 3.7. For n  2, any -EFX allocation is also a
2
2+ -PMMS allocation for any  2 (0; 1], and this is tight.
Proposition 3.8. For n  3, any -EF1 allocation is also an

1+ -PMMS allocation for any  2 (0; 1], and this is tight.
Algorithmic Implications for PMMS. The last two propo-
sitions also have further consequences. First of all, it is
known that for additive valuations, EF1 allocations can be
computed efficiently by a simple round-robin algorithm [Lip-
ton et al., 2004; Caragiannis et al., 2016]. Hence Propo-
sition 3.8 yields a 1/2-PMMS allocation in polynomial time.
Moreover, exact EFX allocations can be computed efficiently
when agents have the same ordering on the values of the
goods [Barman and Krishnamurthy, 2017; Plaut and Rough-
garden, 2018], implying a 2=3-approximation by Proposition
3.7. These are summarized below.
Corollary 3.9. For n  3,
(1) the round-robin algorithm, where each agent picks in her
turn her favorite available item, produces a 12 -PMMS al-
location.
(2) we can compute in polynomial time a 23 -PMMS alloca-
tion when all agents agree on the ordering of the goods
with respect to their value.
It is an interesting open problem to compute a better than
1=2-PMMS allocation for additive valuations. So far, the ex-
istence of 0:618-PMMS allocations has been established but
without an efficient algorithm [Caragiannis et al., 2016].
4 PMMS and MMS Allocations
We now explore analogous questions with Section 3, but start-
ing now with (approximate) MMS or PMMS allocations. We
begin with the guarantees that PMMS allocations imply for
MMS and vice versa. In order to proceed, we will make use
of the following observation, that PMMS implies EFX.
Proposition 4.1 ([Caragiannis et al., 2016]). For n  2, any
PMMS allocation is also an EFX allocation.
For two agents, it is clear by their definition that the notions
of MMS and PMMS are identical. For more agents, by Propo-
sitions 3.3, 3.4 and 4.1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.2. For n = 3, a PMMS allocation is also a 23 -
MMS allocation. Moreover, for n  4, a PMMS allocation is
also a 47 -MMS allocation.
Moreover, the guarantees of Corollary 4.2 are tight for a
small number of agents and almost tight for bigger instances.
Proposition 4.3. For n  3, a PMMS allocation is not neces-
sarily an -MMS allocation for  > 23 and, as n grows large,
for   0:5914.
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Proof. Suppose that we have the following instance with 3
agents and 6 items. The items have the following values for
agent 1:
v1(gi) =

1=2 1  i  3
1 4  i  6
Clearly, 1 =
3
2 . Consider the allocation A = (fg4g;fg1; g2; g3g; fg5; g6g). Assuming that agents 2 and 3 have
large value for their bundles and negligible value for every-
thing else, it is easy to check that A is a PMMS allocation.
However, v1(A1) = 1 = 231. By adding an arbitrary num-
ber of copies of agent 3 and her bundle, this instance can be
generalized to any number of agents.
Next, we show a stronger bound as n grows large. The
construction below achieves the desired bound for n  3  7 
43  1806 = 1; 631; 721. However, there is a smooth transi-
tion from 2=3 to that; e.g., already for n  21 we get a bound
of 3=5, which worsens as n increases. We are going to con-
sider the suggested allocation from the viewpoint of agent 1,
while assuming that agents 2 through n have large value for
their bundles and negligible value for everything else. Since
there is a large number of items, we are not going to define
v1() explicitly, but implicitly through the different types of
bundles the agents get. So consider the allocation A where:
– agent 1 receives 1 item of value 1,
–

n
3

agents receive 3 items of value 12 each,
–

n
7

agents receive 7 items of value 16 each,
–

n
43

agents receive 43 items of value 142 each,
–

n
1807

agents receive 1807 items of value 11806 each,
– the remaining (at least n 12 ) agents receive 2 items of
value 1 each.
It is easy to see that A is EFX. What may not be obvious is
that the number of agents receiving 2 items is at least n 12 .
However, it is a matter of simple calculations to check that 
n
3

+

n
7

+

n
43

+

n
1807

+ 1  n+12 for n  3. We
show now how to get the bound for n = 1; 631; 721 (in which
case the agents receiving 2 items are exactly n 12 ). Then, this
instance can be generalized to any number of agents by just
adding more agents who receive 2 items of value 1 each.
Calculating now 1 is straightforward: in an n-maximin
share defining partition for agent 1, each agent would receive
exactly one item of each type. That is, 1 = 1 +
1
2 +
1
6 +
1
42 +
1
1806 , and v1(A1) = 1 < 0:5914  1.
We continue with the worst-case guarantee we can get for
MMS by an -PMMS allocation, with  < 1. Notice that now
the guarantee degrades with n.
Proposition 4.4. For n  3 and  2 (0; 1), any -PMMS
allocation is also an 2(n 1) (n 2) -MMS allocation but not
necessarily a -MMS allocation, for any  > n 1 (n 2) .
The next result exhibits a sharp contrast between PMMS
and MMS. Although PMMS allocations (exact or approximate)
imply some MMS guarantee, even exact MMS allocations do
not imply any approximation with respect to PMMS.
Proposition 4.5. For n  3, an -MMS allocation is not
necessarily a -PMMS allocation for any ;  2 (0; 1].
We conclude this section by discussing the guarantees of
MMS and PMMS with respect to EF1 and EFX. Even for EF1,
we see that MMS and PMMS differ significantly in what they
can achieve.
Proposition 4.6. For n  2, an -PMMS allocation is also
an 2  -EF1 allocation for any  2 (0; 1), and this is tight.
Proposition 4.7. For n  3, an -MMS allocation is not
necessarily a -EF1 allocation for any ;  2 (0; 1].
When one focuses on guarantees in terms of EFX, there are
only negative results. In fact, it is rather surprising that even
though PMMS implies EFX, an -PMMS allocation with  < 1
does not imply any approximation in terms of EFX.
Proposition 4.8. For n  2, an -PMMS allocation is not
necessarily a -EFX allocation for any ;  2 (0; 1).
Proof. Consider an instance with n  2 identical agents and
n + 1 items. Let  2 (0; 1) and V  maxf1; 1   1g. For
every agent i we have
vi(gj) =
8<: V j = 11   1 j = 21 3  i  n+ 1
We examine the allocation A = (A1; : : : ; An) = (fg1; g2g;
fg3g; fg4g; : : : ; fgn+1g). For any i 6= 1, we focus on agents
i and 1 from i’s viewpoint. It is easy to see that i(2; A1 [
Ai) =
1
   1 + 1 = 1 . Since vi(Ai) = 1, we get vi(Ai) =
i(2; A1 [ Ai). As it is straightforward to see that for any
other pair of agents that there is no envy, we have that A is
an -PMMS allocation. On the other hand, every agent i 2
N f1g envies agent 1 up to any item by a factor  = 1V which
can become arbitrarily small for sufficiently large V .
By Propositions 4.8, 4.7, and 3.1, we also have the same
result for approximate MMS allocations.
Corollary 4.9. For n  2, an -MMS allocation is not nec-
essarily a -EFX allocation for any ;  2 (0; 1).
5 Discussion
The main purpose of this work is to provide a deeper under-
standing of the connections between the exact and the approx-
imate versions of four prominent fairness notions used in dis-
crete models of fair division. In most cases we give tight, or
almost tight, results, providing therefore a close to complete
picture on the status of these questions. Some of our findings
also strike as counter-intuitive, given what was known for the
exact versions of these notions.
A direct implication of our results is the non-existence of
truthful allocation mechanisms for two agents that achieve
any constant approximation of PMMS, EFX, or even EF1. This
follows from the corresponding negative result of Amanatidis
et al. [2017a] for MMS and Propositions 3.5, 3.6, and 4.4. We
defer a more detailed discussion on this to the full version of
the paper.
Aside from the questions raised here, there is an abundance
of interesting open problems for future research. Deciding the
existence of exact EFX or exact PMMS allocations seem to be
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two of the most puzzling such problems. Furthermore, ob-
taining (algorithmically or existentially) allocations with bet-
ter approximation ratios is another class of equally intriguing
problems. So far, we know there exist allocations with ratios
of 0:75, 0:618, and 0:5, for MMS, PMMS, and EFX respec-
tively, out of which, the result for PMMS is existential; our
Corollary 3.9 only yields a 0:5-approximation in polynomial-
time. Finally, the combination of fairness with other desired
objectives, like Pareto optimality, creates further algorithmic
challenges, even for the seemingly easier notion of EF1 [Bar-
man et al., 2018b].
Interestingly enough, our results suggest that improving
the current state of the art in the approximation of one of
these notions does not imply an immediate improvement on
the best approximation ratio for the others, with the notable
exception of -EFX. An algorithmic result with  > 2=3 or
an existential result with  > 0:895 for -EFX would imply
an improved algorithmic or existential result for -PMMS.
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